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LOOSE LIPS WON'T SINK SHIPS: FEDERAL EDUCATION
RIGHTS TO PRIVACY ACT AFTER GONZAGA v. DOE1
I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 4, 1994, with his graduation from the Gonzaga University School of Education approaching, John Doe 2 was called into the
Dean's office. 3 Instead of rewarding news, Doe was given a letter
signed by the Dean stating that she would not be able to attest to his
good moral character, a certification required by the state of Washington prior to the issuance of a license to teach. 4 Doe was shocked to
discover from the letter that a full investigation into an alleged sexual
assault on a girl he had previously dated was now going to prevent him
from realizing his dream of teaching after years of work. Attempting to
remedy the situation, John Doe filed suit against Gonzaga University in
state court alleging that the school violated the Federal Education
Rights to Privacy Act (FERPA) 5 when school officials shared information from his educational record with an outside investigator without
first obtaining his consent, a violation which gives rise to a claim of
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'
1. Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S. Ct. 2268 (2002).
2. "John Doe" is used throughout this article to refer to the Respondent, mirroring
its use in the opinion. Presumably the real identity of Respondent is concealed for
privacy, as well as the use of "Jane Doe" for the alleged victim of sexual assault. See
Doe v. Gonzaga, 24 P.3d 390, 393 n.1 (Wash. 2000) (en banc).
3. Gonzaga v. Doe, 992 P.2d 545, 551 (Wash. App. 2000).
4. Id. at 549-50.
Pursuant to RCW 28A.410.010, the Washington State Board of Education
has promulgated rules governing the teacher certification process. [citations
omitted] The rules require a designated official from a certification
applicant's school to contact several members of the faculty who know or
knew the applicant. The dean must then swear that he or she and the faculty
members consulted have 'no knowledge that the applicant has been convicted
of a crime and [have] no knowledge that the applicant has a history of any
serious behavior problems.'
Id. at 550.
5. 20 U.S.C. § 123 2 g (1994). FERPA is also known as the Buckley Amendment,
named after Senator James Buckley of New York, the senator who introduced the bill.
6. Gonzaga v. Doe, 992 P.2d 545 (Wash. App. 2000). John Doe also alleged
defamation, negligence, and breach of educational contract. These claims will only be
dealt with in so much as they are pertinent to lower courts' decisions on a violation of
FERPA and an individual right to recover under § 1983.
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The superior court found for John Doe and entered judgment for
$1,155,000.00, 7 and the university appealed.' The Washington Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of a directed verdict,
requested by Gonzaga, on the FERPA claim.9 Upon petition of certiorari, an en banc Supreme Court of Washington reversed, reinstating
the trial court's verdict in favor of John Doe on the FERPA violation.' °
The United States Supreme Court granted Gonzaga's petition for certiorari'1 in order to answer whether a violation of FERPA gave rise to an
individual cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.12 The Supreme
Court held that FERPA does not give rise to an individual cause of
action, and a violation can only be addressed administratively as
called for within the Act. 3 By restricting an individual's right to sue,
the Court relaxed the pressure on schools to closely adhere to FERPA
guidelines.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

Factual

On October 5, 1993, Roberta League, certification specialist with
Gonzaga's School of Education, overheard a conversation between
Julia Lynch and a friend. Lynch was describing an incident that
occurred when she was a Resident Assistant in which Jane Doe'"
claimed to have been injured while having sex with John Doe.' 5 Upon
realizing that John Doe was completing his student teaching in the
School of Education, League approached Dr. Susan Kyle, director of
field experience for student teachers. 1 6 The two contacted Lynch several days later and inquired into her knowledge of Jane Doe and John
Doe.17 Lynch recounted how Jane Doe admitted that John Doe sexually assaulted her, requested they have multiple sex partners, and
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 551-52.
Gonzaga v. Doe, 992 P.2d 545 (Wash. App. 2000).
See id. at 555-57.
See Doe v. Gonzaga, 24 P.3d 390, 400-02 (Wash. 2000) (en banc).
Gonzaga v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 865 (2002).
See e.g. Doe, 122 S. Ct. at 2271.
Id.
See supra note 2.
See e.g. Gonzaga v. Doe, 992 P.2d 545, 549 (Wash. App. 2000). Lynch said that

Jane Doe was "in pain . . . couldn't eat... couldn't sleep.... [and] was having blood

in her urine [and] stomach cramps, [all as] a result of having sex with (John Doe)."
16. Id. League testified at trial that as certification specialist, she knew the Dean of
the School of Education would not be able complete the required moral certification if
this information were true, and thus began the investigation.
17. Id. at 549-50.
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coerced her into engaging in deviant sexual behavior.' 8 League and
Kyle convinced Lynch to attempt to learn more from Jane Doe about
her relationship with John Doe. However, when Lynch confronted
Jane Doe, she became angered and said she did not want any investigation conducted or any charges to be filed.' 9
Subsequently, League called Adelle Nore, a senior investigator
with the Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction (OSPI), the
office that regulates teacher education programs.2 ° Nore was contacted at least six times by personnel at Gonzaga in relation to its
investigation of John Doe.2 1 League identified John Doe by name
when referencing the investigation, and Nore advised League that she
should speak with both John Doe and Jane Doe regarding the
incident.2 2
Throughout the rest of the investigation, Jane Doe's testimony
became very equivocal. Kyle met with Jane Doe on October 28, 1993,
where she answered Kyle's questions obscurely, stating she "didn't
know what rape [was]" and that she did not want to press charges.23
Yet, immediately after meeting with Kyle, Jane Doe met with Professor
Sweeney, one of her professors at Gonzaga, who testified Jane Doe was
hysterical, crying, and told him John Doe had sexually assaulted her
three times. 24 Later, Jane Doe met with Janet Burcalow, chair of the
department of teacher education, and attempted to persuade Burcalow
not to pursue the matter, but at the same time would not deny that
sexual assault had occurred.25 Jane Doe also met with Cheryl Lepper,
18. Id. at 550.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Nineteen different Gonzaga personnel were aware of the investigation into
John Doe or assisted with it. See Doe v. Gonzaga, 24 P.3d 390, 393 n.2 (Wash. 2000)
(en banc).
22. Id. The release of John Doe's name and personally identifiable information
regarding the investigation without his consent to Nore is considered the basis of the
FERPA violation, even though this point is not specifically established. See e.g.
Gonzaga v. Doe, 992 P.2d 545, 555-57 (Wash. App. 2000); see also Doe v. Gonzaga,
24 P.3d 390, 400 (Wash. 2000) (en banc).
The Supreme Court did not address whether disclosing John Doe's personal
information to state officials in connection with state law teacher certification
requirements meant that Gonzaga had acted "under color of state law" for purposes of
42 U.S.C. § 1983, since it was decided affirmatively by both lower courts. While this
point was challenged on petition for certiorari, the Court did not address the issue.
Gonzaga v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2272 n.1 (2002).
23. See e.g. Gonzaga v. Doe, 992 P.2d 545, 550 (Wash. App. 2000).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 551.
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an instructor in the teacher education department, and recounted the
sexual assaults.2 6
As such, in February 1994, Dr. Corrine McGuigan, dean of the
School of Education, met with League, Kyle, Burcalow, and Sweeney.27
Dr. McGuigan obtained written narratives of their interactions with
Jane Doe and concluded that she could not swear that John Doe's
moral character was suitable for certification under the Washington
guidelines. 28 Dean McGuigan called John Doe into her office on
March 4, 1994, where he was presented with the letter stating that he
would not receive the necessary certification. 29 This was the first time
anyone had contacted John Doe regarding the investigation into his
alleged sexual assault on Jane Doe.3"
B.

Federal Education Rights to Privacy Act 3"

FERPA began in 1974 as a floor amendment to the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965.32 The amendment passed, but
because it was an amendment made on the floor of the Senate without
the usual committee discussion and debate, there is little legislative
history to reflect its purpose.3 3 Grappling with that absence, some
courts have looked to Senator Buckley's speeches on FERPA to find
evidence that it was intended to curb "the growing evidence of the
abuse of student records across the nation. ''34 FERPA was designed to
address the issues of maintaining the privacy and accuracy of student
educational records, and operates such that the receipt of federal
money is conditional on compliance with the Act's policies.
FERPA says that students (or their parents if the students are
under the age of eighteen 35 ) have the right to inspect and review educational records, 36 challenge the accuracy of the records,3 7 and be notified prior to any release of personal information other than to those
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id. See supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
20 U.S.C. § 12 3 2 (g) (1994).

32. H.R. 69, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
33. See e.g. Johnson, T. Page, Managing Student Records: The Courts and the Family
EducationalRights and Privacy Act of 1974, 79 ED. LAw REP. 1, 2 (1993).
34. Id. at 3.
35. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(d) (1994).
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) and (B) (1994).
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(2) (1994).
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who have a "legitimate educational" interest in the records. 38 The Act
calls for no federal funds to be made available to educational institutions who "have a policy or practice" of violating these provisions.39
FERPA defines "educational agency or institution" as "any public or
private agency or institution which is the recipient of funds under any
applicable program."4 ° "Educational records" are broadly defined,
with certain exceptions,41 to include "any record, file, document, or
other material which contains information directly related to a student
and are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a
person acting for such agency or institution. '42 "Student" is traditionally interpreted to cover "any person [whom the school] maintains
records [on], . . . but does not include a person who has not been in
43
attendance at such agency or institution.

Two important provisions dealing with the enforcement of FERPA
are directed at the Secretary of Education. First, the Secretary shall
take "appropriate actions" to enforce FERPA, and if compliance cannot
be obtained voluntarily from the institution, then and only then may
funding be stopped. 44 Second, the Secretary shall establish "an office
and review board within the Department for the purpose of investigating, processing, reviewing, and adjudicating violations of this section
and complaints
which may be filed concerning alleged violations of
45
this section.

38. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (1994).
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a) and (b). Courts interpreting FERPA provisions generally
have found that individual instances of violations, do not rise to the level of "policy or
practice" necessary to have a violation of the Act. See e.g. Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287
F.3d 138 (2nd Cir. 2002); Daniel S. v. Bd. of Educ., 152 F. Supp.2d 949 (N.D. Ill.
2001); Achman v. Chicago Lakes Ind. Sch. Dist., 146 F. Supp.2d 1137 (D. Minn.
1999); Com. v. Buccella, 751 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 2001).
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(3).
41. Some exceptions are: "records within the sole possession of the maker thereof
not revealed to another person, records of law enforcement units of educational
agencies, employment records of educational institution personnel who are not
students, and records kept by an educational institution's physician, psychiatrist, or
other treating personnel of the school." 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B).
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A).
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(6).
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1 23 2 g(f).
45. 20 U.S.C. § 12 3 2 g(g). The enforcement of FERPA is carried out by the Family
Policy Compliance Office (FPCO). See also Gonzaga v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2283
(2002) (J. Stevens, dissenting).
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42 U.S.C § 198346

Section 1983 offers citizens a remedy for state or federal violations of constitutional or federal statutory rights.4 7 While it does not
create any rights of its own, section 1983 offers the pathway to achieve
relief from violations of rights created elsewhere in federal statutes.
John Doe argued that FERPA created a right to privacy and that section
1983 was the proper outlet to obtain relief for the school's violation of
that right. Prior to Gonzaga, the Court had established a clear line of
cases interpreting the language "and laws" within section 1983 to offer
protection for "rights" that were created by Congressional law. This
analysis began in Maine v. Thiboutot,48 and continued for seventeen
years through Blessing v. Freestone.4 9 This section offers an overview of
the changing interpretation of section 1983's protection of statutorily
created rights from its origination to the doorstep of the Court's discussion in Gonzaga.
In Maine v. Thiboutot50 the United States Supreme Court broadened its interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of only allowing a remedy
for civil rights violations or equal protection claims, by including
under the language "and laws," any rights found in statutes promulgated by Congress. 5 1 Respondents in Thiboutot alleged the state violated the Social Security Act 5 2 when it withheld certain welfare
benefits that the Act entitled them to receive. 53 Finding Respondents
were indeed given a right under the Social Security Act, the Supreme
Court held that the statutorily created right was violated "under color
of state law," and thus redressable under section 1983." 4
Later, the Court addressed the Brooke Amendment to the Housing
Act in Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority.5 5 The
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 provides
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
47. See e.g. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
48. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
49. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
50. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
51. See e.g. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1994).
53. See e.g. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 3-8.

54. Id. at 4-8.
55. See Wright v. Roanoke Redev. and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
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Brooke Amendment created a ceiling on the amount public housing
56
authorities could charge for rent and utilities in government housing.
The Amendment stated low income people "shall pay as rent" a specified percentage of their income. 57 The Court found that the Housing
Authority violated this provision when an amount in excess of the
stated percent per annum was charged for utilities.58 Although the
Housing Authority argued that Congress did not intend to confer a
right to have reasonable utilities included as rent, the Court held that
"reasonable," in the context of the Act's specific guidelines, did in fact
create a specific and definite right for low income people in government public housing.5 9
However, by the time the Court heard Wright, it had created two
exceptions to the general rule of allowing a section 1983 claim for violations of statutory rights. 60 The first exception is "where Congress
has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment, "61
and the second is "where the statute did.not create enforceable rights,
privileges, or immunities within the meaning of [42 U.S.C. § 1983]."62
In Middlesex v. National Sea Clammers Association, the Court felt Congress intended to foreclose a section 1983 action due to the "comprehensive remedial scheme" provided within the statute for dealing with
violations.6 3 In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, the
Court acknowledged that a statute may create only a Congressional
preference-a "nudge in the preferred [direction]"-and not an enforce-

56. See e.g. Wright, 479 U.S. at 420 n.2.
57. Id. Within the Act and its amendments, 30 per centum of adjusted family
income was the amount to be charged. HUD has also always interpreted "rent" to
include a "reasonable" amount for utility costs. Petitioners allege they were
overcharged on their utility costs, and Respondents deny this claim and allege this cost
was a surcharge on "excess" usage.
58. See id. at 429-31.
59. Id. at 431-32.
60. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981);
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l. Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
61. Wright, 479 U.S. at 423
62. Id.
63. Id. "In both Sea Clammers and Smith v. Robinson, the statutes at issue
themselves provided for private judicial remedies, thereby evidencing congressional
intent to supplant the § 1983 remedy." Id. at 427. See also Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. Nat'l. Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1 (1981) where the Court held that
allowing a section 1983 cause of action was inconsistent with Congress's "carefully
tailored scheme" of administrative remedies dealing with violations of the Education
of the Handicapped Act. See also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
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able right.6 4 In Wright, however, the Court held that the Brooke
Amendment did not fall into either of these exceptions. 65
Similarly, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, the Court
again held a section 1983 remedy was available to enforce the Boren
Amendment to the Medicaid Act, which established a right of health
care providers to receive "reasonable and adequate" reimbursement
from state governments.6 6 Under the Medicaid Act, states receive federal money to furnish medical care to needy individuals as long as the
states meet certain federal guidelines, which are administered both
through the Act itself and by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 67 One of the requirements is that states receiving federal Medicaid funding must present the Secretary with a plan to reimburse
health care providers.6 8 The Boren Amendment calls for those plans to
"'reasonabl[y] and adequate[ly] . . . meet the costs which must be

incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities."' 6 9 Noncompliance with this requirement could restrict the amount of money
states receive from the Federal government. 70 The Court followed the
analysis in Wright, holding that the Medicaid Act created a "reasonable" reimbursement right for health care providers and was not merely
a congressional preference. 7 The Court also noted that Congress had
not foreclosed enforcement of the Medicaid Act under section 1983
because there was no clear statement within the Act, nor was there a
comprehensive scheme of enforcement.7 2
64. Wright, 479 U.S. at 423 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)).
65. See Wright v. Roanoke Redev. and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
66. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Assn., 496 U.S. 498, 501-02 (1990).
67. See id.at 502.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 505-20. The Court stated that whether an enforceable right was created
or not "turns on whether 'the provision in question was intended to benefit the
putative plaintiff.' If so, the provision creates an enforceable right unless it reflects
merely a 'congressional preference' for a certain kind of conduct rather than a binding
obligation on the governmental unit .. " Id. at 509 (quoting Halderman, 451 U.S. at
19). The Court also established that congressional history of the Medicaid Act showed
a clear intent to create a binding obligation on states, thus creating an enforceable
right. See id. at 505-08.
72. See id. at 520-24.
Petitioners concede that the Medicaid Act does not expressly preclude resort
to § 1983. In the absence of such an express provision, we have found private
enforcement foreclosed only when the statute itself creates a remedial
scheme that is 'sufficiently comprehensive ...to demonstrate congressional
intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.'
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This same section 1983 analysis did not yield an enforceable right
in Suter v. Artist,7 3 where the Court held that the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act did not create an enforceable right."4 Similar to
the Medicaid Act, the Adoption Assistance Act allowed reimbursement
from the federal government to states administering adoption and foster care services. 75 Restrictions on this money, like those in the Medicaid Act, also included submitting a plan to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services-a plan that called for, among other things, "reasonable efforts" to be made to keep or return a child to his home
before placing him in foster care.7 6 Although the language is similar to
that found in of Wilder, here the Court rejected finding an enforceable
right because there was no further statutory guidance as to how "reasonable" is to be measured. Thus, the difference in the Court's reasoning was that the Medicaid Act contained other guidance to interpret
"reasonable" where as the Adoption Assistance Act did not.7 7 The
Court concluded "that the 'reasonable efforts' language does not
unambiguously confer an enforceable right upon the Act's beneficiaries," and "in this context is at least as plausibly read to impose only
a rather generalized duty on the State, to be enforced not by private
individuals, but by the Secretary. '78 Therefore the Court found that
the Adoption Assistance Act fell into the exception discussed in
Wright, where the statute did not create an enforceable right.
Continuing to slightly narrow its original interpretation of section
1983 asserted in Thiboutot, the Court in Blessing v. Freestone held that
an enforceable right was not given to mothers who were attempting to
claim that the State's failure to obtain child support payments for them
violated their "rights" under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. 79
The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals deciId. at 521. (quoting Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Assn., 453

U.S. 1, 20 (1981)).
73. See Suter v. Artist, 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
74. See id.
75. See id. at 350.
76. Id. at 351.
77. Id. at 359-60. In Wilder
[w]e relied in part on the fact that the statute and regulations set forth in
some detail the factors to be considered in determining the methods for
calculating rates .... In the present case, however .... [nmo further statutory
guidance is found as to how 'reasonable efforts' are to be measured .... How
the State was to comply with this directive, and with the other provisions of
the Act, was, within broad limits, left up to the State.
78. Id. at 363.
79. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
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sion that had allowed a cause of action under section 1983 to enforce
"rights" given mothers under Title IV-D. 8 ° Supporting its decision to
vacate, the Court determined that the Plaintiff did not allege what specific rights were created, and that in finding an appropriate right, the
court of appeals looked too broadly at the statute, not precisely identifying what rights, if any, were at issue.8 1 Since Plaintiff had only
alleged failure on behalf of the State for not "substantially complying"
to determine what
with Title IV-D, the Court vacated and remanded
82
particular "rights" were allegedly created.
Even though not resulting in a right, Blessing offers a precise
method of analysis for determining whether a particular federal statute
creates a right that is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff.83 Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
right assertedly protected by the statute is not "so vague and amor84
phous" that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.
Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on
the states.8 5 Then, even if a plaintiff demonstrates that a federal statute creates an individual right, there is only a rebuttable presumption
that the right is enforceable under section 1983.86 Because the inquiry
focuses on congressional intent, dismissal is proper if Congress "specifically foreclosed a remedy under [section] 1983. "87 Congress may
do so expressly, by forbidding recourse to section 1983 in the statute
itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme
that is incompatible with individual enforcement under section
1983.88
80. Id.
81. Id. at 341-46. "[T]he lower court's holding that Title IV-D 'creates enforceable
rights' paints with too broad a brush. It was incumbent upon respondents to identify
with particularity the rights they claimed, since it is impossible to determine whether
Title IV-D, as an undifferentiated whole, gives rise to undefined 'rights."' Id. at 342.
"We do not foreclose the possibility that some provisions of Title IV-D give rise to
individual rights. The lower court did not separate out the particular rights it believed
arise from the statutory scheme, and we think the complaint is less than clear in this
regard." Id. at 345. The Court went on to distinguish the precise rights alleged in
Wright and Wilder. See e.g., Blessing 520 U.S. at 342-46.
82. Id. at 346-49.
83. Id. at 340 (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 430).
84. Id. at 340-41 (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32).
85. Id. at 341 (citing Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510-11).
86. Id. at 341.
87. Id. at 341 (citing Smith v. Robinson, 486 U.S. 992, 1005 n.9 (1984)).
88. Id. at 341 (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994)).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol25/iss2/3
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Thus, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove a right is created, and then
the burden shifts to the State to determine if the statute itself forecloses
a section 1983 action. This analysis was in place as the Court in Gonzaga was called on to determine if FERPA created a specific right that
was enforceable under section 1983.
III.

ANALYSIS

While the trial court found for Respondent on the enforceability
of FERPA under section 1983, the Washington Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that FERPA does not "confer a benefit upon the putative plaintiff," and therefore creates no individualized right.8 9 The
appellate court analogized FERPA to the statutes at issue in Blessing
and Suter, noting that the "policy or practice" language within FERPA
supported an aggregate focus instead of an individualized right to privacy. 90 The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the court of
appeals, reinstating the trial court's entry of judgment for the Respondent on section 1983.91 The court addressed the issue of "policy or
practice" finding evidence that Gonzaga University had a practice of
informing OSPI about students with whom they were concerned. 92
The court reasoned that FERPA does "convey a benefit on the putative
plaintiff," which is not "vague and amorphous," and therefore creates a
binding obligation on states. 9 3 The court cited a developing line of
federal precedent holding that FERPA created an enforceable right,
thereby resting its decision on previous FERPA decisions instead of the
court of appeals' broader analogous reasoning to other section 1983
cases.

94

Opening with a statement regarding the split decisions on the
issue of whether FERPA creates a right that is enforceable under 42
89. Gonzaga v. Doe, 992 P.2d 545, 555-57 (Wash. App. 2000). The Court relied
on the Supreme Court's analysis of other section 1983 cases in deciding if
congressional intent was present within the statute.

90. Id.
91. See Doe v. Gonzaga, 24 P.3d 390, 400-02 (Wash. 2001) (en banc).
92. Id. at 400. The jury heard testimony that Gonzaga personnel routinely called
OSPI, before a student's application for certification was submitted, to talk about
students as to whom they had "cause for concern" and to obtain advice. Nore testified
that the calls about John Doe that OSPI received from League and others were typical
of conversations she had with Gonzaga personnel.

93. Id. at 400-01.
94. Id. at 401 n.12.; Falvo v. Owassa Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir.
2000); Brown v. City of Oneonta Police Dep't., 106 F.3d 1125 (2nd Cir. 1997); Tarka
v. Cunningham, 917 F.3d 135 (5th Cir. 1990); Tarka v. Franklin, 891 F.2d 102 (5th
Cir. 1989); Lewin v. Med. Coll. of Hampton Roads, 931 F. Supp. 443 (E.D.Va. 1996).
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U.S.C. § 1983, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, set out
to "resolve the conflict among lower courts and in the process resolve
any ambiguity in our own opinions (referring to the broader discussion of statutory rights enforceable under section 1983)." 95 Rather
than addressing specifically whether FERPA creates a particularized
right to privacy, a study of the Court's opinion demonstrates a greater
concern for restructuring the law on the enforceability of all statutory
rights arising out of spending legislation. 96 The majority opinion
rejects Respondent's claim (that absent a student's consent FERPA creates an enforceable right to nondisclosure of personal information)
arguably as a mere mouthpiece to announce that the Supreme Court is
closing the door on statutory section 1983 claims. 97
A theme of the majority opinion, upon which the concurrence and
dissent depart, is that a federal statute should contain an "unambiguous [congressional] intent" to create a right before the Court should
otherwise recognize one. 98 In doing so, the majority directs its attention not only to the first element necessary for a section 1983 claim,
but also the first element for an implied right of action. 9 9 The Court
points out that the inquiry into a section 1983 claim and an implied
95. Gonzaga v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2272 (2002). Highlighting the division
among the courts, the majority notes: "[tihe fact that all of these courts have relied on
the same set of opinions from this Court suggests that our opinions in this area may
not be models of clarity. We therefore granted certiorari, (citation omitted), to resolve
the conflict... [and] any ambiguity in our own opinions." While the Court in Owassa
Ind. School Dist. v. Falvo, 122 S.Ct. 934 (2002), held that the process of "peer
grading" did not violate FERPA, the issue of a section 1983 claim was not addressed by
the Court, even though argued in lower courts. See e.g. Gonzaga, 122 S.Ct. at 2272
n.2.
96. See e.g. Gonzaga v. Doe, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (2002). "[W]e have never before held,
and decline to do so here, that spending legislation drafted in terms resembling those
of FERPA can confer enforceable rights." (emphasis added) Id. at 2273. See also
Gonzaga, 122 S.Ct. at 2280 . Stevens, dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2273, 2275, 2278. Justices Breyer and Souter concurring: "I would not, in
effect, pre-determine an outcome through the use of a presumption-such as the
majority's presumption that a right is conferred only if set forth 'unambiguously' in
the statute's 'text and structure."' Id at 2279. See also Gonzaga, 122 S.Ct. at 2280
(Stevens and Ginsberg, J. dissenting).
99. Id. at 2275.
We now reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an
unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under
§1983 .... [W]e further reject the notion that our implied right of action
cases are separate and distinct from our § 1983 cases. To the contrary, our
implied right of action cases should guide the determination of whether a
statute confers rights enforceable under § 1983.
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right of action claim "overlap in one meaningful respect-in either case
we must first determine whether Congress intended to create a federal
right."100 Nonetheless, the Court attempts to maintain the overall distinction between the two causes of action, "since § 1983 merely provides a mechanism for individual rights 'secured elsewhere'.

. .

. One

cannot go into court and claim a 'violation of § 1983'-for § 1983 by
itself does not protect anyone against anything."' 1 Yet an implied
right of action means that one is alleging that the "statute manifests an
intent 'to create not just a private right but also a private remedy."" 2
In a section 1983 claim, plaintiffs "do not have the burden of showing
an intent to create a private remedy because § 1983 generally supplies
the remedy for the vindication of rights secured by federal statutes." 1o3
The Court begins its section 1983 analysis by reviewing its previous cases in the area. As such, looking at FERPA, the first step is to
determine whether Congress intended to create a right.10 4 While Blessing and Wilder seemed to state that congressional intent to create a
right can be proven through showing that a benefit has been conferred
on the putative plaintiff, the Court tightens that definition to require
an unambiguous showing within the text and structure of the statute. 10 5 This is presumably a more stringent requirement for congressional intent than expressed in Blessing; however, the Court states that
nothing less has ever been required. 10 6 The Court applies this "new"
standard and determines that FERPA does not create a right, 0 7 claim100. Id. (emphasis in original). While this article focuses on FERPA and its
relationship to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is important to note the difference in a section
1983 action and an action based on an implied right within the statute. The Supreme
Court laid out a four factor test in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), to determine
whether a statute created a right, a violation of which would allow the person to sue
under the statute itself, without resorting to section 1983. As noted, the first element
in both causes of action is to first determine if Congress intended to create a right.
Gonzaga is examined in this article for its relationship to FERPA and the recent line of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases, not for its relationship to implied right of action cases. This
would be an appropriate area for further study, but is not fully addressed here.
101. Id. at 2276 (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600
(1979)).
102. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286
(2001)).
103. Id.
104. See supra note 71.
105. Id. at 2274-77.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2277. "To begin with the provisions entirely lack the sort of "rightscreating" language critical to showing the requisite congressional intent to create new
rights." (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288-89 (2001)).
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ing that FERPA's language is directed to the Secretary of Education,
and has an aggregate focus, speaking mainly of a "policy or practice"
of abuse.' 0 8 The Court concludes that absent more particularized language this aggregate focus cannot create the individualized right necessary to proceed.
However, Justice Stevens disagrees with the Court's characterization of FERPA as having an aggregate focus. While citing Blessing as
requiring a particularized right, he affirms Respondent's contention
that 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) creates a right of nondisclosure of personal
information from a student's record without consent.' 0 9 Therefore,
applying the Court's section 1983 analysis, Stevens would find that
FERPA does create an enforceable individual right." 0 Stevens points
out this creation of a "right" is furthered by looking at the statute as a
whole; after all, it is the "Family Educational Rights to Privacy Act.""'
Furthermore, Stevens considers the language in FERPA more indicative
of congressional intent to create a right than any of the other statutes
the Court previously held to create rights." 2
While Stevens touches on Senator Buckley's speech," 1 3 neither the
majority nor the dissent attempts to conduct a typical review of the
congressional record to determine Congress's intent when forming
FERPA. Neither the majority nor dissent even refers to its peculiar
absence, except inasmuch as the majority finds the statute absent any
rights-creating language. Yet Justice Stevens is critical of the Court
overturning what he sees as settled law: FERPA creates an enforceable

108. Id. at 2277-78.
109. Id. at 2281. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b).
110. Id.
This provision [section 1232g(b)] plainly meets the standards we articulated
in Blessing for establishing a federal right: It is directed to the benefit of
individual students and parents; the provision is binding on States, as it is
'couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms'; and the right is far
from 'vague and amorphous.'
111. Id. (emphasis in original).

112. Id. at 2281-82. "Indeed, the right at issue is more specific and clear than rights
previously found enforceable under § 1983.... As such, the federal right created by
§ 1232g(b) is 'presumptively enforceable by § 1983."' Stevens, noting again the
Court's emphasis on unambiguous language, states, "[tihe sort of rights-creating
language idealized by the Court has never been present in our § 1983 cases; rather,
such language usually gives rise to an implied cause of action." Id. (emphasis in

original).
113. Id. See also supra note 34.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol25/iss2/3
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right under section 1983."14 "The Court does not cite-nor
can it-a
' 15
contrary."'
the
to
opinion
court
high
state
or
circuit
While precedent does not ultimately bind the Supreme Court,
here the Court seemed to deliberately and subtly cut against it. In
particular, Gonzaga created many discrete and narrow factual avenues
the Court could have used in reversing the Washington Supreme
Court. Instead, the Court swept broadly, choosing to shut the door116to
any case alleging a section 1983 remedy for a violation of FERPA.
Prior to this opinion, in order to recover from a violation of a federal statute, a plaintiff must have been able to prove that Congress
intended to create a right and that the right created was indeed violated. Section 1983 merely provided the method of remedy for the particular violation. Here, John Doe had to prove that Congress intended
a right of privacy; that the right was applicable to him; that the right
was violated; and that section 1983 offered an appropriate remedy. If
FERPA creates a right to non-disclosure of information at all, it is limited at best.1 17 Essentially the right would only be violated if the disclosure of information was made to someone who was not "exempted"
and without securing the student's consent." 8 One of the first exceptions-categories of people to whom release of information would not
be a violation-are "school officials ... who have been determined by

such agency or institution to have legitimate educational interests.""' 9
This language is certainly broad enough to include an investigator with
OSPI, thereby supporting a decision to dismiss as a matter of law, not-

114. Id. at 2283-284. "Since FERPA was enacted in 1974, all of the Federal Courts
of Appeals expressly deciding the question have concluded that FERPA creates federal
rights enforceable under § 1983. Nearly all other federal and state courts reaching the
issue agree with these Circuits." Id. at 2284 n.6. See also Falvo v. Owassa Ind. Sch.
Dist., 233 F.3d 1203, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 534 U.S. 426, 122
S. Ct. 934 (2002); Tarka v. Cunningham, 917 F.2d 890, 891 (5th Cir. 1990); Brown v.
Oneonta, 106 F.3d 1125, 1131 (2nd Cir. 1997) (citing Fay v. South Colonie Cent. Sch.
Dist., 802 F.2d 21, 33 (2nd Cir. 1986)).
115. Id. at 2284 n.n. 6 & 7.
116. Arguably, the Court shut the door to § 1983 recovery from any statute. Since
congressional intent to create a right must be clear, it is likely that any statute falling
short of creating an implied cause of action will not support recovery under the
Court's current § 1983 analysis. If the statute's "rights creating" language is clear, an
implied cause of action would yield an opportunity to sue without requiring § 1983.

117. There are 15 exceptions to the student (parent) consent requirement before
release of educational records. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a) (2002).
118. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2002).
119. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1) (2002).
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withstanding the fact that Gonzaga may have had a policy or practice
12
of calling and consulting Ms. Nore. 1
Yet by not taking a particularized factual approach, the Court
swept broadly through the Act itself, stating that it created no right
enforceable under section 1983. By closing the door on any section
1983 claim arising from a violation of FERPA, the Court left parents
and students with only the enforcement provisions found within 20
U.S.C. 1232g. 121 Therefore, the only remedy afforded to parents and
students is to file a complaint with the Family Policy Compliance
Office (FPCO), who will then conduct an investigation into whether a
violation has occurred. 122 If the FPCO determines that a violation has
occurred, it gives the "agency or institution a statement of the specific
steps it must take to comply with FERPA."' 23 And, according to section 1 2 32g(f), the agency or institution will only lose funding from the
124
Secretary if "compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means."
As such, an institution will not lose its funding when a single
FERPA violation occurs or when a policy or practice of violations is
realized, but only after failing to implement the specific steps designed
by the FPCO to bring the school back into compliance. Since a sole
disclosure cannot amount to a violation and the Court has foreclosed
the threat of suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, FERPA offers no remedy to
any one parent or student-no matter how egregious the "violation"
might have been. Removing the credible threat of private suit from the
radar screens of school administrators who may violate FERPA means
those administrators will likely relax their guard and allow the very
information the statute was designed to protect out into the public,
remedying the situation only after instructed by the FPCO.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is likely that Gonzaga University changed its policies on investigating education students for their moral certification following the
120. So long as Gonzaga had disclosed, pursuant to annual requirements, that
personnel associated with OSPI had a legitimate educational interest in the
information contained within the records, no violation of FERPA could have been
supported. 34 C.F.R. § 99.7(a)(3)(iii) (2002). No court hearing this case established
these facts.
121. Presumptively, if FERPA does not contain the requisite congressional intent to
create an enforceable right under § 1983, then it does not create the right and remedy
necessary for an implied right of action.
122. 34 C.F.R. § 99.64 (2002); see also Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2278; 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(f), (g).
123. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.66(b), (c)(1) (2002); Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2278.
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1 2 3 2 g(f); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.66 (c)(2), 99.67 (2002).
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results of this case. However, many other similarly situated schools
breathed a sigh of relief at the decision and will likely continue to utilize policies that may be in violation of FERPA. While the Family Policy
Compliance Office investigates complaints from students and parents
who allege violations of FERPA, this department does not actively seek
out institutions who may have a policy or practice that is in violation.
The FPCO offers proactive advice for institutions that call or write
requesting information on whether their actions violate FERPA. Arguably these requests come into the FPCO not because institutions are
concerned about losing their funding, at least initially, but because
institutions are concerned about having to defend against a potential
lawsuit-a concern that has been greatly reduced after the Supreme
Court's holding in Gonzaga.
Since the United States Supreme Court held FERPA does not create a right enforceable under section 1983, many potential plaintiffs
will likely not file suit against their educational institutions.125 Also,
with a built-in opportunity to comply with FERPA, institutions may
decide to leave cost-efficient, yet questionable, policies or practices in
place until told otherwise. If the Court had dealt with Gonzaga on the
merits, it is likely they could have supported the same decision on
much narrower grounds; thus leaving precedent undisturbed and leaving parents and students the ability to hold an institution individually
accountable for breaches of FERPA.
However, since the Court closed this avenue, the first student or
parent that experiences a violation of a school policy cannot receive
retribution, but may only prevent the experience for others that come
after them. And until Congress addresses the issue again, institutional
loose lips will not sink their ships.1 2 6
D. Martin Warf

125. See e.g. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (holding attorney's fees available
to plaintiffs successful in a section 1983 action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 would also
apply to those alleging violations of federal laws).
126. Presumably, shifting the "rights" debate back to Congress, in order to develop
more exacting standards, was exactly the Court's purpose in taking away its ability to
decide matters of FERPA. See e.g. Gonzaga v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268 (2002).
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